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THE CULTURAL CONTRADICTIONS OF SOCIALISM
By Chandran Kukathas
Render possessions ever so equal, men’s different degrees of art, care,
and industry will immediately break that equality. Or if you check
these virtues, you reduce society to the most extreme indigence; and
instead of preventing want and beggary in a few, render it unavoid-
able to the whole community. The most rigorous inquisition too is
requisite to watch every inequality on its first appearance; and the
most severe jurisdiction, to punish and redress it. But besides, that so
much authority must soon degenerate into tyranny, and be exerted
with such great partialities; who can possibly be possessed of it, in
such a situation as is here supposed?
—David Hume1
I. Socialism’s Destiny
While no one has yet announced the death of capitalism, reports of its
imminent demise have been as numerous as they have been exaggerated.
Such reports have usually been bolstered by thoughtful analyses of the
fundamental contradictions of capitalism, which was expected to come
sliding —if not crashing —down under the weight of its own inconsisten-
cies. Leaving aside Karl Marx’s own predictions, twentieth-century ana-
lysts as diverse as Joseph Schumpeter, Daniel Bell, and Jurgen Habermas
have asserted that the contradictions of capitalism could only mean that
its days were numbered.2 Alas, all that has been established by these
analyses is that predictive failure is no impediment to market success:
either the consumer’s demand for such theories of capitalism’s failures is
naturally robust, or supply continues to generate its own demand.
More recently, however, socialist writers have been forced by certain
events to turn their attention to the reasons for the failure of socialism.
Nowhere has anything remotely resembling the socialist model of a good
society appeared. And the societies that undertook serious attempts to
build socialism produced only tyranny and human misery. The more
vigorous the attempt, the more vicious the tyranny, and the more com-
1 David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, in Hume, Enquiries Con-
cerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge,
rev. P. H. Nidditch, 3d ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 194.
2 See Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (New York: Yale University
Press, 1942); Daniel Bell, The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism (London: Heineman, 1976);
and Jurgen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis (London: Heineman, 1979).
18 © 2003 Social Philosophy & Policy Foundation. Printed in the USA.
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plete the misery. The revolutions of 1989 suggested to many that the
populations of the former socialist states decisively rejected socialism. For
many socialists, however, the social experiments that were the Soviet Union,
Cambodia, East Germany, Bulgaria, Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Viet-
nam, and Yugoslavia (like the continuing ones in Cuba, North Korea, and,
to a lesser degree, China) were not experiments in genuine socialism, since
genuine socialist transformation was prevented by state tyranny. For
others, like John Roemer, the problem lies, in part, in socialism’s lack of a
sound economic theory.3 And yet others have continued to wonder whether
some modified version of socialism, stripped of its nineteenth-century
naivete about economic planning and cleansed of its twentieth-century
totalitarian associations, might not have a better shot of supplanting cap-
italism not only in practice, but also in the mind of the public.
The thesis of this essay is that the achievement of socialism is unlikely
because the reasons for its failure stem not from such contingent factors,
but have their roots in the aspirations of socialism itself. Socialism is by
its very nature doomed to failure. This is not to say that socialists are
doomed to political failure, for socialist political leaders and parties will
undoubtedly come to power from time to time. It is simply to say that the
doctrine by which socialists are guided is destined never to be fulfilled.
Economically, it cannot succeed for reasons that critics like F. A. Hayek
and Ludwig von Mises advanced.4 The deeper problem, however, is not
economic but political.
Socialism, in the end, lacks not only a plausible economic theory, but
also a coherent political one. Indeed, in most of the variants articulated by
socialist theoreticians, from Marx to the present, it lacks a political theory
altogether. Socialist thinkers have usually presented social transformation
3 See John Roemer, Analytical Foundations of Marxian Economic Theory (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1989).
4 Ludwig von Mises had argued as early as 1920 that socialism was technically impossible
because, in the absence of prices set by competitive markets, producers would be unable to
make even simple decisions about what to make, or to decide which inputs to choose in the
production process. The absence of prices would make it impossible to tell which materials
were scarcer or more valuable. See Ludwig von Mises, Socialism: An Economic and Sociological
Analysis, trans. J. Kahane (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 1981). This argument was also put
forward by F. A. Hayek in the 1930s in his critique of socialism’s leading theoreticians, such
as Oskar Lange and H. D. Dickinson. Hayek suggested that, under socialism, the absence of
prices would make comparative cost calculation impossible: the centralization of production
decisions would lead to the discoordination between the demand and supply of goods. The
result would be inefficiency, chronic shortages of some goods and the oversupply of others,
and, ultimately, material poverty. Indeed, Hayek thought that this problem would remain
even under modified variants of socialism such as “market socialism.” See F. A. Hayek, ed.,
Collectivist Economic Planning: Critical Studies in the Possibilities of Socialism (London: Rout-
ledge and Kegan Paul, 1935). See also Hayek’s essays on socialist calculation in F. A. Hayek,
Individualism and Economic Order (Chicago: Midway, 1980). For a modern discussion of the
socialist calculation debate, see Don Lavoie, Rivalry and Central Planning: The Socialist Cal-
culation Debate Reconsidered (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985). For recent de-
bate among socialists on these issues, see Bertell Ollman, ed., Market Socialism: The Debate
Among Socialists (New York: Routledge, 1998).
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as the solution to social ills, since the source of those ills has been held to
be the social and economic order in which private interests and market
relations are dominant. Once market relations are transformed, they have
assumed, the way would be open for rule by the collective in the interest
of the whole. In these circumstances, there is little need to say anything
about how political institutions under socialism would check and control
the exercise of power. The problem of the abuse of power no longer needs
to be considered. It is liberal political theory that has focused on the
problem of controlling the abuse of power, since it assumes that there will
always be a danger of such abuse —for in any society there will always be
particular interests trying to gain advantages for themselves. Tyranny is
always possible. But socialism assumes —or hopes —that such problems
will not arise, and so does not assume the need for a political theory.
Indeed, were it to borrow from a theory of politics (such as the liberal
theory) that might help it address the problem of tyranny, it would un-
dermine altogether the assumptions underpinning its economic am-
bitions. Yet in avoiding such borrowing, socialism has also avoided
addressing the problem of how there can be a socialist order that is not
simply a dictatorship by a socialist political elite. This is true of the so-
cialisms described by almost every socialist thinker, even though all of
them envisage the good socialist order not as a dictatorship, but as a
society marked by collective self-rule for the good of the whole.
The argument of this essay is that socialists are destined to be disap-
pointed, for what they want simply cannot be achieved under any form
of socialism. To defend this contention, this essay is divided into a num-
ber of sections. Section II begins by considering what socialism is, taking
note of its variety of forms, but looking to establish what is crucially
important to the socialist ideal in general. Section III then turns to the
economic critique of socialism, briefly recounting the reasons for its fail-
ure as an economic system. Section IV, however, goes on to argue that it
is not the economics of socialism that is the problem, but the politics,
explaining why at the heart of socialist theory there is no understanding
of either human nature or humanity’s political predicament and, sub-
sequently, no theory for dealing with that predicament. Section V then
moves on to consider some modern attempts to rethink socialism, and
argues that these are unlikely to be successful. This essay concludes with
some general reflections on the demise of socialism and what it means not
only for the socialist ideal, but also for other political utopias.
II. What Is Socialism?
The difficulty of defining, or identifying with reasonable precision, a
term as protean as ‘socialism’ cannot go unremarked in any effort to
establish a working definition. It is a term which has been used to de-
20 CHANDRAN KUKATHAS
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0265052503201023
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://w
w
w
.cam
bridge.org/core . Singapore M
anagem
ent U
niversity (SM
U
) , on 29 A
ug 2019 at 03:36:53 , subject to the C
am
bridge C
ore term
s of use, available at https://w
w
w
.cam
bridge.org/core/term
s .
scribe economic systems, political regimes, and social movements, as well
as a kind of ethical ideal. It is quite correct to say that it is a system of
economic organization in which private property and the distribution of
income are subject to collective social control, rather than determined by
the efforts of individuals pursuing their own interests. What exactly ‘col-
lective control’ means, though, is a matter for debate. It is quite correct to
say that socialism is the negation of capitalism, since that is how socialists
have commonly defined their creed for nearly two centuries. But what,
exactly, capitalism amounts to is no less contentious than is the definition
of its antithesis. It is also correct to note, however, that socialism, as a
philosophical doctrine that values community, rejects above all the indi-
vidualism it sees at the heart of liberal political thinking. Yet what exactly
it is about individualism that socialism repudiates is a matter that has
forced socialists into endless debate.5
The problem of defining socialism does not get any easier with the
proliferation of kinds of socialism. Before Karl Marx, numerous varieties
of socialism proliferated in the writings of such thinkers as Claude-Henri
de Rouvroy Saint-Simon, Charles Fourier, Robert Owen, and Pierre-
Joseph Proudhon. Even Marxian socialism comes in a number of kinds; it
was joined by guild socialism and Christian socialism in the nineteenth
century, and various forms of noncommunist socialism in the Western
European countries of the twentieth century. Fabian socialism appeared
in Britain in 1884, while English ethical socialism emerged after World
War II. And, of course, the socialism of the centrally planned command
economy was attempted in the Soviet Union and its satellites. Since the
demise of Soviet socialism, both as a theory and as a regime, various
theories of market socialism have gained a greater prominence in the
literature of political theory and political economy. How can a definition
of socialism be found that might make sense of this variety? Indeed, one
has to wonder whether it makes sense even to talk about ‘socialism’ as
such, since concepts with long histories often have vastly different mean-
ings in different eras.
There is a further reason why defining socialism is a matter that should
be approached with some caution, particularly in any kind of critical
endeavor. A term that could encompass a great range of theories, but
describes each only imperfectly, threatens to do violence to the arguments
and theories of individual socialist thinkers. It is all too easy, and com-
mon, for critics to lump their opponents into a general category and then
to dismiss them by attacking the category, even if many of those thinkers
have themselves recognized the difficulties in their general theoretical
orientations and have sought to modify their own theoretical variants. If
5 For a general history of socialism that discusses its various attitudes toward indi-
vidualism, see George Lichtheim, A Short History of Socialism (London: Weidenfeld and
Nicholson, 1970).
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the purpose of finding a definition of socialism is to criticize socialism, it
is important that such a definition capture what is central, and necessary,
to it rather than only those features which are expendable.
It is important, in the end, to establish what lies at the core of the
socialist idea because socialists continue to line up behind its banner and
to defend their offerings in its terms. And if a general critique is to be
offered of this brand of politics, a general definition of some kind has to
be found. A helpful place to start might be G. A. Cohen’s reflections on
the nature of the ideal that socialists like himself hoped to see realized by
the Soviet Union. This ideal was a society that included,
instead of the class exploitation of capitalism, economic equality;
instead of the illusory democracy of class-based bourgeois politics, a
real and complete democracy; instead of the alienation from one
another of economic agents driven by greed and fear, an economy
characterized by willing mutual service.6
What socialism wishes to supplant is an economic system, and a form
of social organization more generally, in which economic relations allow
the strong to dominate the weak, in which the political relations allow the
economically powerful few to control the people as a whole, and in which
human relations are such that people cooperate for mutual gain out of
self-interest rather than out of fellow-feeling. Such a system could not be
eradicated unless it were replaced by one in which the shape of society
was the product not of the blind play of individual choices but of the
conscious and deliberate direction of the society as a whole.
What socialism seeks, above all, even if not exclusively, is a kind of
unity. A socialist society is not a divided society —divided by the bound-
aries that distinguish people into classes, separating rich from poor, and
see some individuals rule over others. A socialist society is one in which
society’s interests are attended to by society collectively. According to
socialism, this requires a society in which economic production is con-
trolled not by private individuals, but by society as a whole. This means
social rather than private ownership of the economy. In such a society,
there is no division between labor and capital. Socialism is a system
characterized by social or collective ownership or control of the produc-
tive property of society. Its most powerful advocate was Karl Marx, and
its antithesis from the beginning was the “system of natural liberty”
advocated by Adam Smith in his defense of commercial society. Its phil-
osophical advocates today are numerous, and their nemeses in the late
twentieth century are proponents of libertarian theories, such as F. A.
Hayek and Robert Nozick.
6 G. A. Cohen, Self-Ownership, Freedom, and Equality (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1995), 253.
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III. The Economic Critique of Socialism
Socialists today, to the extent that they have been chastened not only by
the collapse of Soviet power and the fall of Communist regimes, but also
by the obvious poverty of socialist societies, have conceded that much of
socialist economic theory is unsustainable. In particular, many have ac-
cepted that the arguments advanced by economists of the Austrian school,
explaining why socialism could not succeed, were fundamentally sound.
The most powerful arguments challenging the feasibility of socialism,
as noted above, came from economists of the Austrian school, such as
F. A. Hayek and Ludwig von Mises. It is worth observing that many
socialists have conceded that these arguments were decisive against par-
ticular aspects of the socialist idea. Adam Przeworski, for example, is one
socialist writer who concedes that the model of “command” socialism
developed in the Soviet Union was unable to withstand the Austrian
critique, which was decisive in demonstrating that socialist central plan-
ning was an implausible ideal. First, even if the planner had genuine
information, the sheer complexity of the problem would make rational
allocation of productive resources and distribution of output among house-
holds impossible to handle. Second, if individuals are at all self-interested,
the planner cannot find out the true needs of households and the true
capacities of firms without the use of markets. Third, there is no reason to
think that planners in any case have any incentive to promote the general
welfare, and there are no monitoring mechanisms in the social plan that
would serve such a purpose. Finally, the entire enterprise rested not only
on the planners solving the calculational problem, but also on economic
agents, which include households, firms, and planners, as co-owners of
society’s wealth, cooperating to support collective welfare. But, as Prze-
worski observes, “none of these assumptions has worked under really
existing socialism.” 7 This was made quite clear by Hayek and Mises, and
was amply confirmed by experience.
Similarly, Cohen has admitted that two of the four major socialist ob-
jections to the market —that it was inefficient and that it was anarchic —
were simply misplaced. The traditional socialist view that the market was
unplanned failed to understand how well the unplanned market orga-
nized information, and how difficult it was for a central planner to ac-
quire the information about preferences and production possibilities
dispersed throughout the market. Cohen states: “Even if the planner’s
computer could do wonders with that information, there would remain
the problem that there are systematic obstacles to gathering it: to that
extent, Von Mises and Hayek were right.” 8
7 Adam Przeworski, “Socialism and Social Democracy,” in Joel Krieger, ed., The Oxford
Companion to the Politics of the World, 2d ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 777.
8 Cohen, Self-Ownership, Freedom, and Equality, 260.
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And indeed, in the world of twentieth-century practice, socialist econ-
omies failed to achieve the levels of wealth attained not only by the
capitalist West, but even by many developing nations. Living standards
in the Soviet Union, Poland, and Czechoslovakia in the 1980s could barely
match those of Malaysia, let alone Singapore. For all of Nikita Krush-
chev’s promises in the late 1950s and early 1960s that the U.S.S.R. was
about to overtake the United States, history saw the Soviet economy in
the 1970s and 1980s fall deeper and deeper into crisis, struggling to feed,
clothe, and house its own population. Socialist economics generated not
greater wealth but greater poverty.
Yet even as its critics argued that socialism would not deliver economic
prosperity, and practical experience in socialist states demonstrated this
for all to see, for much of the twentieth century, socialism’s theoretical
defenders had the better of the argument —if success is measured by
intellectual popularity. Socialist economic theory was taken seriously in
Western academies, and economists like Oskar Lange and H. D. Dickin-
son were widely held to have had the better of the debate with Hayek and
Mises in the 1930s over the problem of economic calculation under so-
cialism. And even in the latter part of the twentieth century, those who
conceded that the Austrian critique of socialist economics was persuasive
argued that a modified variant of socialism —like “market socialism” —
would prove successful. A part of the problem, however, was that the
empirical evidence was not favorable. Not only had the model of socialist
central planning been found wanting in a stagnating Soviet Union, but
even in Yugoslavia, where a form of market socialism had been tried, the
results were not encouraging. If socialism was an economic system in
which the right to accumulate capital was limited and the market for
labor was restricted or nonexistent, socialism simply could not produce
the goods. To some extent, this was recognized by some socialists many
years ago when they conceded that markets and private property had an
important part to play in any good society.9
Yet even if this is the case, some writers maintain that defenders of
capitalism need to be more cognizant of the fact that the market, or
capitalism, has important defects. These defects are moral defects, for
markets corrode morality. Two kinds of challenges need to be noted here:
the first points to empirical evidence of the market’s inadequacy, and the
second points out theoretical reasons for why markets do not sustain
morally acceptable societies.
The empirical point is made quite clearly by Canadian political philos-
opher Ronald Beiner, who concedes that socialism may be less productive
than capitalism, but openly asks whether the inefficiency of socialism
may not in fact be an asset: “It is hardly ever considered that it may in fact
9 One of the earliest to do so was British socialist theorist, C. A. R. Crosland, notably in
C. A. R. Crosland, The Future of Socialism (London: Jonathan Cape, 1956).
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constitute a political advantage of socialism that such economies operate
less efficiently and thus offer fewer goods to be distributed.” 10 Beiner
wants not only to suggest that there are things that are more important
than productivity, consumption, or economic growth, but also to point
out serious defects in capitalist societies that are not weighed in the
balance when they are compared with socialist ones. For example, he cites
low crime and unemployment rates in the Soviet Union as underrated
measures of socialism’s own achievements. On the converse side, he adds,
“it is scarcely less stunning that pervasive drug taking, rampant sexual
exploitation, the addiction to consumerist ‘lifestyles’, and the ubiquity of
the credit card in Western societies are not commonly taken as key indi-
cators of political debility relative to other societies.” 11 Not surprisingly,
Beiner is sympathetic to Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn’s critique of Western
freedom as the source also of Western debauchery: the West’s wealth is
spent on sex and drugs, rather than on finer pursuits.
Beiner’s arguments about crime and unemployment being virtually ab-
sent under Soviet socialism are not persuasive. As the Soviet Union began
to stagnate under the Brezhnev administration, full employment contin-
ued to exist only in name as people were kept shuffling goods and paper
in uneconomic enterprises (which produced less than they consumed) or
in pointless public-service positions —all for pitiful wages. (“They pretend
to pay us, and we pretend to work.”) The poverty of Soviet citizens was
simply the inescapable consequence of a backward economy in which most
of the factories and production plants were found to be worthless by the
Western companies that acquired them in the 1990s. As to the absence of
crime, it is simply wrong to suggest that it was negligible. Pilfering of com-
munal property was rife —unsurprisingly, given the poverty endured by
most Soviet citizens. And statistics revealing these, as well as more seri-
ous, crimes were simply suppressed by a regime unwilling and unable to
address the problem. It is also worth noting that the penalty for criminal
conviction was frequently exile into smaller centers, remote from the large
cities, so that, unusually, smaller towns had higher crime rates than did
big cities in the Soviet Union.12 Claims about socialism’s success in the
Soviet Union have always been greatly exaggerated.13
10 Ronald Beiner, What’s the Matter with Liberalism? (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1992), 152. (Beiner’s book was first published in 1992, and is written in full awareness
of the demise of communism initiated by the revolutions of 1989.)
11 Ibid., 153.
12 In one way, however, the low crime rate in the Soviet Union is beside the point: it was
also low in the World War II death camps at Dachau and Belsen, but this is hardly worth
putting into the equation.
13 For an analysis of poverty under Soviet Communism, see Mervyn Matthews, Poverty in
the Soviet Union (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986). For more general assess-
ments of the weaknesses of the Soviet socialist system, see Janos Kornai, The Socialist System:
The Political Economy of Communism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); and Tim-
othy J. Colton, The Dilemma of Reform in the Soviet Union (New York: Council on Foreign
Relations, 1986), esp. 32–67.
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But Beiner has a point, nonetheless. Wealth does bring with it more
debauchery and excess. The only purpose of production is consumption;
the more that is produced, the more that will be consumed. And this will
mean that even as more fine wine is produced, so will more cheap liquor
be drunk; as more music is written and played, so will more vulgar noise
be marketed and listened to by more and more people; and as more fine
philosophical papers are produced, defending (or asking what’s the mat-
ter with) liberalism, so will more cheap magazines appear detailing the
exploits of the Duchess of York. Drugs and pornography are the product
of economic and political freedom, at least insofar as they cannot be
produced if people are not allowed, or cannot afford, to have them —
though it would be implausible to suggest that such things are not to be
found in unfree societies at all. But if poverty is the solution, many think
that the cure is worse than the disease.14 In the end, market freedom
brings bad along with the good: the vulgar accompany the refined, the
ugly the beautiful, the shallow the profound, and the grotesque the blessed.
Those who think that one can be had without the other are mistaken.
There is, however, a deeper objection that socialists raise against cap-
italism. The problem with market societies is that they not only condone
the pursuit of baubles and trinkets that have no real worth, but they also
work to undermine the very values upon which markets rely. Markets
depend upon the existence of moral standards, for unless people are
prepared to keep promises and honor contracts, production and exchange
would not be possible. But markets, by encouraging selfish consumption,
teach people to become competitively self-regarding rather than cooper-
atively moral. Capitalism, it is sometimes said, consumes its own moral
capital.
This claim, however, is not so readily defensible. It is a variant of the
argument Rousseau presents in his Discourse on the Origin of Inequality,15
which offers a conjectural history that explores human nature, as well as
its transformation with the emergence of market society. As individuals
become socialized, they learn to compare themselves with one another
and to crave the good opinions of their fellows —learning, in the end, to
become vain and deceitful (a talent for deceit being among the qualities
most necessary for advancement).16 Is this not what happens in market
societies, as people discover that the best way to get ahead is to appear
what they are not, and, even better, to take advantage of their fellows?
In fact, as Adam Smith argued in his Theory of Moral Sentiments, the
14 Some, of course, think that the disease is not that bad; but that is another matter.
15 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discourse on the Origins of Inequality, in Rousseau, The Social
Contract and Discourses, trans. G. D. H. Cole, rev. J. H. Brumfitt, John C. Hall, and P. D. Jimack
(London: Everyman, 1993), 31–126.
16 Rousseau, however, did not suggest that commercial society was the cause of this
transformation. Nor, in the end, did he think that abandoning commercial society was a
plausible solution.
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reverse is more likely true. Morality develops not under the direction
of an authority —under the guidance of the “man of system” —but spon-
taneously —under the guidance of an “invisible hand.” 17 What makes
people moral is precisely what Rousseau thought made people vain: the
craving for the good opinion of others. Indeed, Smith argued, so much
did people internalize the longing for approval that they came to desire
not mere approval, but worthiness of approval.
In capitalist societies, so much turns on approval by others —one’s
fellows generally, rather than merely those in authority —that the best
strategy to adopt is to become worthy. Of course, one might do even
better if one were duplicitous while most others were honest. But at the
same time, when so much turns on people’s reputations, everyone also
has an incentive to invest resources in checking on people’s reputations.
So the costs of dishonesty can be high. This argument is not, of course, to
suggest that there is no dishonesty or immorality in market societies.
Quite the contrary. The point is that, just as there are features of market
society that undermine moral conduct, so are there features of it that also
generate moral behavior. Maybe capitalism will eventually run out of
moral capital; but it probably will not any time soon.
In the end, however, no account of the failings of capitalism has been
enough to demonstrate that socialism is not beset by insuperable eco-
nomic problems. Many socialists have thus conceded that some rapproche-
ment is needed between socialism and the market. For some, this means
revising socialism, or asking which socialism is feasible and worthy of
pursuit.18 The question is, can a reworked or improved model of social-
ism serve as an ideal that is both attractive and feasible?
IV. The Politics of Socialism
Even if the theoretical problems of socialist economics could be over-
come, the future does not look bright for socialism. Socialists desire not
merely prosperity (albeit, a prosperity in which wealth is distributed
more equitably than it has been in the past), but a classless society char-
acterized by “real” democracy and “willing mutual service.” It is no part
of the socialist ideal that the good society be one in which the poor are
dominated by the rich, or the weak are dominated by the strong —or in
which the right dominate the wrong. Socialism envisages a society in
which people cooperate willingly to produce and sustain a world that is
both equitable and prosperous. A dictatorship, even of the wise and the
good, has to be anathema to socialism —despite the fact that socialists
have too often in the past declared the need for a temporary dictatorship
17 Adam Smith, Theory of Moral Sentiments (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 1982).
18 Norberto Bobbio, Which Socialism? Marxism, Socialism, and Democracy, trans. Roger Griffin,
ed. Richard Bellamy (Oxford: Polity Press, 1987), esp. chap. 5.
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to usher in a new order. But this is where socialism’s problems begin. For
if socialism repudiates dictatorship, what kind of politics can it endorse
and aspire to, if socialist ideals are to be both attained and sustained? Is
there a politics that will produce and maintain socialism?
On this pressing problem, socialism has had surprisingly little to say.
Perhaps, though, this will be found to have been not so surprising after all
when the argument of this essay is concluded. Socialist thinkers have
been quick to point out the shortcomings of political societies under
capitalism; and their analyses of the workings of the state, and the ways
in which they serve particular interests rather than the common good,
have often been acute and insightful.19 But they have had little to say
about the political process by which a socialist society might come into
being, and virtually nothing to say about the politics of the way a socialist
society would work. Socialists have had even less to say about how such
a society would deal with the problem of political power.
Yet why does this matter? The reason it matters is that, if socialism
rejects dictatorship, it faces a fundamental problem: a pluralist politics
threatens to undermine the entire socialist project. A pluralist political
order is one that is pluralist in two respects. First, it is pluralist because
political rule involves decision-making that is the outcome of interaction
(and very likely contestation) among a variety of political groups with
distinct (even if overlapping) interests. Second, it is pluralist because
these groups, with their distinct interests, are to some degree indepen-
dent, and capable of marshalling their own resources to assert, argue for,
and defend their interests in the political arena. Both dimensions of plu-
ralism are important, if a political society is indeed to be regarded as
pluralist. If there is no economic pluralism because all groups are wholly
dependent upon the ruling individual or group for access to resources,
there can be no political pluralism other than in name, for dependent
groups would be powerless even to assert, much less defend, their inter-
ests. If, however, there is economic pluralism but no mechanism by which
independent groups can make a difference to political outcomes, the pol-
ity would not be a pluralist one. Either independent groups would be
forced to conform —in which case, pluralism vanishes —or they would be
allowed to go their separate ways —in which case, they would not be part
of any political whole that might be regarded as pluralist. If socialism
rejects dictatorship, it must embrace a politics that is to some degree
pluralist. The question then becomes: Why would a pluralist politics
produce or sustain socialism?
19 A notable example is to be found in Marx’s critique of Hegel’s theory of the state, and,
in particular, Hegel’s account of the bureaucracy as attending to the interests of the univer-
sal class. See G. W. F. Hegel, The Philosophy of Right, trans. T. M. Knox (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1978). For Marx’s critique, see the early essays: Karl Marx, “On the Jewish
Question,” in David McLellan, ed., Karl Marx: Selected Writings (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1977), 39–62; and Karl Marx, “Towards a Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right: An
Introduction,” in McLellan, ed., Karl Marx: Selected Writings, 63–74.
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A part of the problem for socialists here is that there is a fundamental
reason to expect a pluralist politics to repudiate socialism. Socialism re-
jects, and tries to suppress, economic pluralism. Socialism is hostile to
economic pluralism because economic power wielded by particular in-
terests rather than by the collective as a whole will serve only those
interests, and at the same time will threaten to promote a distribution of
goods that favors some over others. Capitalism is the pluralistic economic
system par excellence. In it, the smallest group, or even a single individ-
ual, can amass substantial resources and, thus, considerable economic
power. Capitalism is that economic system which is least subject to col-
lective control. And it is the economic system of which socialists are most
critical —even if, to be sure, few socialists would prefer to return to pre-
capitalist modes of production. Given that socialism is antipathetic to-
ward economic pluralism, there is every reason for those individuals and
groups not politically or ideologically committed to socialism to reject
anything that proposes to deprive them of their resources and diminish
their independence. Socialism, whether or not it serves the general inter-
est, is not in the interest of particular interests.
Under a pluralist politics, then, socialism is unlikely to win general
support, even if socialist parties may be elected to office in a pluralist
democracy. (Electoral victory need reflect nothing more than popular
disaffection with other candidates and the victor’s capacity to make the
best use of the electoral system.) Historically, socialism has found little
support anywhere, and has never had majority support for any signif-
icant length of time. (Social democratic parties, such as the British La-
bour Party, have been successful largely to the extent that they have
downplayed their socialist ideals.) Socialist parties have more com-
monly come to power by force. They have from time to time won
electoral victories —as, for example, did Salvador Allende’s Frente de
Accion Popular in 1970, in a coalition that secured 36 percent of the
popular vote in Chile after promising to carry out a democratic transi-
tion to socialism.20 But attempts to overthrow or transform capitalism
have not met with general support. Certainly, Allende’s efforts to move
toward socialism, even though his government left large parts of the
economy in private hands, produced vigorous opposition from those
who stood to lose —as well as from political actors opposed, in princi-
ple, to such changes.
The point of all this is that socialist politics faces a major problem that
it has never properly confronted. If socialism repudiates dictatorship, and
embraces a pluralist politics in which private interests retain the right and
the capacity to act independently to defend those interests, then socialism
20 Allende’s coalition government, known as the Unidad Popular (UP), secured 44 per-
cent of the vote in popular elections in 1973, though this group included a greater range of
parties, including Radicals, Social Democrats, and some disaffected members of the Chris-
tian Democrats, as well as the Socialists.
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will never get off the ground. For socialism is, in principle, opposed to a
political system in which private interests hold sway. If socialism curbs
those private interests, however, and subordinates them to the ruling
group (albeit, one ruling in the name of the collective), then a pluralist
politics will no longer exist, except possibly in name.
In one sense, however, this problem would remain, even if a major-
ity of people did support socialism. For unless support were more or
less unanimous, socialism would in effect end up suppressing those
particular interests that repudiate socialism. Under socialism, they would
not have the capacity to use their resources to pursue their separate
interests, since the proper use of those resources would be collectively
determined.
The problem, in the end, is that people have different desires, different
interests, and, maybe most importantly, different ideas about what is
good and bad, right and wrong. If so, a significant plurality of any society
is going to resist moves to subordinate their interests to the interests of
others (even if they are told that this is in the interest of the whole), and
to subordinate their ideas of what is right to the ideas of others.
It is perhaps this problem that has led so many socialists to conclude
that socialism requires a transformation of human consciousness before
there can be a transformation into a truly socialist society. For some so-
cialists, this required a temporary dictatorship of the proletariat, even if
others may have been willing to wait more patiently for a popular con-
vergence on socialist attitudes. But the assumption that human conscious-
ness will be transformed or that there will be a general convergence on
socialist attitudes (so much so that people will cease to pursue their
particular interests, or stop insisting on different views of what is right) is
surely implausible. Yet if we grant that we should assume that people will
differ, and that society will be marked by a plurality of interests and
moral attitudes (and, thus, by a plurality of groups), it does not look like
socialism is going to have much of a future.
Socialism’s theoreticians have generally failed to deal with this issue. In
the end, there simply is no political theory of socialism, even though there
are socialist critiques of both capitalism and the liberal state.
V. Retrieving Socialism
Now to say that there is no political theory of socialism is to make a
large claim, and if it is correct it would suggest that the socialist ideal is
in a parlous state. Yet it would be wrong to say that no socialists are aware
of this lacuna in socialist theory, or that no one has tried to remedy the
deficiency. David Miller, for example, pointed out in 1989 that “[t]he
socialist tradition has never developed an adequate theory of politics, in
the sense of an account of what the nature, scope, and purpose of political
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activity should be.” 21 The influence of nineteenth-century positivism in
this regard, Miller argues, probably exercised a malign influence on so-
cialist thinkers, from Marx to the Fabians, who tended to hold to an ideal
of social organization that was essentially nonpolitical: “Once conflicting
class interests had been eliminated with the abolition of classes, the only
remaining question was how best to advance shared interests of all the
members of society. This was a technical, rather than a political, ques-
tion.” 22 And Miller, for one, has made a significant attempt to remedy
this deficiency in socialist theory. Nonetheless, the results have not been
promising for socialism, and it is worth considering why by examining
more closely Miller’s efforts to fill the gap.
According to Miller, we need to distinguish two conceptions of politics:
politics as “interest-aggregation” and politics as “dialogue.” The first, he
says, is associated with the liberal outlook, while the latter is appropriate
to socialists. The first conceives politics as a process of bargaining among
competing interests, and its outcome is a compromise that commands the
support of at least a bare majority.23 Politics as dialogue, however, con-
ceives of the political process as one characterized not by bargaining, but
by attempts at persuasion, and as one in which the outcome is not com-
promise but consensus.24 The interest-aggregation model of politics, ac-
cording to Miller, has three flaws. First, it favors those who are powerful.
Second, it does not distinguish between interests that are sound and those
that are defective or even irrational, since reasons do not play any part in
the process of reaching a decision. Third, since there is no rational method
of aggregating preferences, the outcomes of interest-aggregation are in
the end simply arbitrary.25 The dialogue model of politics, Miller argues,
promises to do much better.
The dialogue model would do better, in fact, because it is through
political dialogue that “collective identity and will” may be expressed.26
For socialists wish to foster a sense of common identity; and the forging
of a national identity is an important part of the purpose of political
education.27 While liberals thus “attempt to formulate a policy of toler-
ation which remains blind to the content of the beliefs and practices” of
different cultures, socialist policy has to “take account of the interplay
between public and private cultures.” What is at stake is “citizen identi-
ty,” which cannot be taken for granted: “[I]t may have to be protected
against the encroachment of ethnic and other sectional loyalties.” 28
21 David Miller, Market, State, and Community: Theoretical Foundations of Market Socialism
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 252.
22 Ibid., 252.
23 Ibid., 254.
24 Ibid., 255.
25 Ibid., 255–57.
26 Ibid., 274.
27 Ibid., 293.
28 Ibid.
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What Miller wants to defend here is the political ideal of citizenship in
the nation-state, which he sees as essential for the establishment of a
socialist community. Such a state would, however, have to be a constitu-
tional state. For while the state has important functions to perform (and
Miller lists five: a protective function, a distributive function, economic
management, the provision of public goods, and self-reproduction29), it
also has to solve two important problems. First, there is the problem of
how to prevent the bureaucracy from turning itself into a new ruling elite;
and second, there is the problem of how to forge the popular will in a
large, modern society. For Miller, this requires a complex constitutional
state: one in which there is no sovereign power in the Hobbesian sense,
but in which power is hived off to various bodies, none of which is
supreme —though there would need to be a constitutional court to adju-
dicate disputes over the boundaries of authority.30 Thus, for example,
given its role as economic manager, the state would have responsibility
for making decisions about capital investment. But responsibility for mak-
ing particular decisions would be left to autonomous bodies —albeit, bod-
ies subject to the guidelines mandated by the constitution of a socialist
state.31
The socialist state, according to Miller, must be a limited and constitu-
tional state. While it has radical tasks to perform, many of those tasks are
best achieved in a roundabout way. As Miller explains:
It needs to bind itself internally by specifying the functions of each
constituent body (legislative, administrative, etc.) and appointing
watch-dogs to guard the boundaries. Externally, its goals may best be
achieved by, for instance, creating an appropriate incentive system
and then allowing markets to operate; or by establishing semi-
autonomous bodies acting under policy guidelines. It should not be
the benevolent colossus of socialist myth; but nor, for the same rea-
son, need it be the malevolent leviathan of libertarian nightmare.32
This view of politics under socialism, however, is seriously flawed in
two crucial respects. First, it rests upon assumptions about political be-
havior that are altogether too optimistic and it neglects to deal with the
problem of political power. In this respect, it offers us, in the end, not so
much a theory of politics as an account of what socialists hope politics
will be like. Second, it does not make political space for the possibility
that people might reject socialism. Yet a society of the sort that socialism
envisions, in which people cooperate voluntarily and are willing partici-
29 Ibid., 295–98.
30 Ibid., 301.
31 Ibid., 312.
32 Ibid., 319.
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pants in a collective endeavor, cannot exist unless it is possible for people
to reject this ideal.
The problem with socialism’s view of politics, in the end, is that it does
not take seriously enough the problem of lust: lust for political power.
This is not because only a crude realist view of politics is admissible.
There is more to political life than the simple exercise of force or the
driving of hard bargains. Considerations of morality have a role to play,
no less than do considerations of honor, affection, advantage, and fear.
But this complexity should not blind us to the fact that in politics the
drive for power is of tremendous significance, whether those pursuing it
are motivated by high-minded ideals or by the desire to enrich them-
selves, their families, and their friends. In this game, people will cheat, lie,
and steal. Opponents will, from time to time, be blackmailed or killed,
and colleagues will be betrayed. Rules will be bent, broken, rewritten,
reinterpreted, and, when possible, ignored —all in the pursuit of political
goals. Even in the freest and most open political system, political actors
will be found to have embezzled money, covered up law-breaking, misled
the public, fiddled elections, bribed officials or important leaders of busi-
ness or labor, and generally been guilty of sleazy dealings. This is not the
whole of politics, but it is certainly a part of its rich tapestry.
When we consider this, the contrast Miller draws between politics as
dialogue and politics as interest-aggregation seems wide of the mark
because it offers us a false account of the alternatives, contrasting a de-
scriptive theory with a normative one. Those who have defended the
interest-aggregation model of politics have not always been as sanguine
as Miller’s account implies about the prospects of political bargaining
producing outcomes that are truly reflective of the general interest. In-
deed, the only respect in which the interest-aggregation model is at all
compelling is as an account of politics that emphasizes that the outcome
of politics is always a compromise that reflects the strengths of the con-
testing parties in the process. The moment it begins to suggest that this
outcome might somehow amount to something that is good or desirable
in itself, it becomes less persuasive. It is convincing only as a descriptive
account, but not as a normative account, for as Miller quite rightly points
out, the outcome of interest-group bargaining is highly arbitrary. But this
means that to contrast a descriptive account of politics —the interest-
aggregation model —with what is essentially a normative account —the
dialogue model —is a little misleading.
But in any case, the dialogue model of politics is not particularly con-
vincing to the extent that it offers us little more than fine sentiments about
what politics ought to be like, with little to reason to think that it could be.
To be sure, in any decent political system there will be an important
element of dialogue —for a political order in which reasons and argu-
ments had no sway would be one in which humanity was entirely absent.
But it would be too much to expect reason and argument, or a disinter-
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ested concern for the common good, always —or even regularly —to over-
come partiality, pride, or the sheer desire for power. The Athenians engaged
in dialogue with the people of Melos and offered them reasons why they
should surrender and submit to Athenian rule. And the Melians, in turn,
answered and explained why they would rather not. But the Athenians
did not like that answer and so slaughtered the men of Melos, and en-
slaved the women and children.
What a socialist theory of politics needs to offer is not simply an as-
sertion that dialogue in search of consensus would be better. This is not
only because consensus is not always better, or even possible —what, after
all, would a consensus between Athens and Melos have looked like? We
can easily accept that dialogue is generally better. What socialism needs
to offer is a theory explaining why it thinks that a dialogic model of
politics is possible. The liberal theory of politics assumes that it is not,
because dialogue will not dominate interest. According to the liberal
view, political power is something that needs not so much to be har-
nessed as to be constrained. This is not because all men are knaves, but
because the risk of the abuse of power, and the devastating consequences
such abuse can bring, compel us to make this assumption. The best so-
lution is to divide and devolve power so that the harm caused by the
politically ambitious is minimized. But for this devolution to be effective,
it must do more than simply establish a hierarchy under which power is
formally divided. Power must also be separated, so that there are genu-
inely independent sources of power capable of challenging or resisting
any authority that threatens to misrule. Indeed, this kind of separation of
power is necessary simply so that the ruled have the resources to scru-
tinize the workings of rulers. In the end, good government cannot be
mandated, or guaranteed by a constitution. Its existence can only be made
a little less unlikely by institutions that make it difficult for any individ-
ual, group, or party to rule unchecked.
Miller’s theory of politics does not give the same weight to this
concern. While he is aware of the danger of a ruling elite arising, his
solution is for the state to “bind itself internally” and then appoint
watchdogs. But from a liberal point of view, this does not take seri-
ously enough the problem of who will watch the watchdogs. What is
needed, according to liberals, is not for the state to be internally bound,
but for it to be externally accountable —for it to be watched by people
who lie beyond its power. This will not prevent rulers from behaving
corruptly, or stop other political actors from behaving badly in the
pursuit of power or in their efforts to influence rulers to rule in their
favor. But it should limit the damage of corruption, particularly to the
extent that the separation of powers in society places limits on the
scope of state activity. The outcome of such a politics will always be an
imperfect compromise; but the point is not to obtain a particular highly
desired outcome, but only to minimize highly undesirable ones. Social-
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ist politics is not greatly sensitive to this concern. Nor is it particularly
sympathetic to the liberal solution of decentralized social power. But
this is not so surprising, since socialism is marked by a hostility to any
social order that is characterized by a diversity of competing, private
interests. It wants an order in which private interest is subordinated to
the interest of the whole. What it has never offered us, however, is a
convincing theory of the politics of such an order.
Socialists, in principle, are against dictatorship. But the problem for
a socialist politics that repudiates dictatorship is that it must leave
open the possibility that socialism would be rejected by the people
through the political process. And this it has never been willing to
do —perhaps unsurprisingly, since to many this would amount to an
abandonment of the socialist ideal. Thus, socialists like Miller take very
seriously the problem of social reproduction, for socialism must put
in place institutions that make it unlikely that socialism will be re-
jected in the future. Yet the more seriously this is done, the less scope
there is for people to reject socialism. Either their choices will be lim-
ited or their desire to make particular changes will be reshaped by the
socialist polity. Yet this significantly weakens any claim socialism might
be able to make that it is a political system that is a voluntary scheme
of social cooperation or, in Cohen’s words, “a real and complete
democracy.”
Now it might be argued that the same goes for liberalism or for capi-
talism: these also are self-reproducing and self-perpetuating political and
economic systems. Yet this is simply not so —or, at least, not in the same
way. As Schumpeter pointed out in Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy,
one of capitalism’s most striking features is its propensity to create and
nurture people who are critical of capitalism. Indeed, Schumpeter saw in
this feature of capitalism the seeds of its own destruction. Capitalism was
unlikely to survive, he thought, because it did not generate its own ideo-
logical support, but, on the contrary, gave succor to an intellectual elite
that was highly critical of its workings.33
The same point could equally be made about liberalism. Liberal po-
litical systems are noteworthy not only for tolerating a wide variety of
ways of life, but also for accepting, and upholding, the freedom of
dissenters to criticize and try to change the liberal order. Liberals will
accept within their political midst communists, fascists, anarchists, con-
servatives, and religious zealots, as well as socialists, social democrats,
and market socialists. Indeed, because it is characterized by a devolu-
tion of both authority and social power, a liberal order may well con-
tain subgroups or substate systems (say, in a federation) that are run
according to illiberal principles. Liberals, if they are consistent, will
press for the devolution of power (or the acceptance of devolved power)
33 Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, chap. 22.
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before they will call for the enforcement of liberal principles within any
political association or group.34
Socialism, unlike liberalism, however, attaches great importance to so-
cial unity, and sees in political activity an opportunity to bring about an
end to the divisions that mark a society in which private interests have
free reign. But the trouble with political activity is that if people are
allowed the freedom to engage in politics, they will not only push in
different directions, but also decline to push (in sufficient numbers) to-
ward socialism. What is needed from socialist political theory is an ex-
planation of how there can be a political order in which people are both
free to choose socialism and actually do choose socialism —without that
order being simply one in which majority preference subordinates that of
the minority. What is needed is an explanation not of why a nondictato-
rial socialist politics is desirable, but how such a politics is possible.
VI. Conclusion
Socialism was perhaps the most important political movement of the
twentieth century. It was the ideology that guided or motivated some of
the most ambitious attempts to transform society in order to create a
better world. It dominated politics in India, China, and the Soviet Union
and its satellites, as well as the agendas of major political parties through-
out Western Europe. For much of that time, the future of socialism was
thought to be a promising one, and theoretical discussions asserted or
assumed its coming success, while the arguments of its detractors were
dismissed. Its economics was alleged to be more productive and its pol-
itics more in tune with the twentieth century’s turn toward democratic
equality. The failure of socialism, however, has revealed that its economic
theory is untenable, and its political theory is nonexistent. The former
failing has been well understood for some time. But the failure of social-
ism to develop a plausible political theory has not been fully recognized.
One consequence of this latter failing is that socialists continue to try to
develop socialist theories of justice and equality, even though it is hard to
see how this could be of any interest in the absence of a socialist theory
of politics.
Yet perhaps this does not much matter. For if the argument of this essay
is to be believed, there is no plausible theory of politics that would prove
of much help to socialists —at least for as long as they continue to hold on
to socialism’s original ideals rather than simply to, say, an ideal of liberal
equality. Liberal politics, in the end, has only one aim: to prevent tyranny.
This is vital if liberty is to be enjoyed by the people. The modern eco-
34 I recognize that this is a controversial point. I have defended this view at length in
Chandran Kukathas, The Liberal Archipelago: A Theory of Diversity and Freedom (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2003).
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nomic system most compatible with this aim is capitalism; and liberals
are, by and large, willing to accept the outcomes that this system gener-
ates, including economic inequality and political compromise—even com-
promise with socialist demands. Socialism, however, wants a politics that
will combine nontyranny with a particular outcome: socialism. But this is
not possible because, in a nontyrannical political order, a variety of out-
comes is possible, and outcomes will change from time to time. Thus, if
socialists want to preserve nontyranny, they will have to work within the
pluralist politics of liberalism (avoiding proposals that will weaken checks
on power) and give up on the possibility of an enduring socialist polity.
This, from a socialist point of view, is not a happy fate. But it must, after
all, be the kind of fate to which any ideology must reconcile itself if it is
so mistaken as to hope to see a society that honors its principles and
places them above politics. For as long as people have a propensity to
think for themselves and to think differently, no political ideology will
win a permanent, or even a particularly enduring, victory. This goes for
socialism as much as it does (alas) for one of the major alternatives to
socialism, which, as it happens, also lacks any sort of a theory of politics:
the libertarian theory of the minimal state.35
Politics, Australian Defence Force Academy
35 Libertarianism is subject to the same problem that socialism faces: if it tolerates plu-
ralism and repudiates dictatorship, there is no reason to think that libertarian principles will
generally be embraced or chosen by the political process. By libertarianism, I mean the
political theories associated with such thinkers as Robert Nozick, Ayn Rand, and Murray
Rothbard, rather than the liberal tradition (from John Locke to F. A. Hayek) more generally.
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